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According to some, the economic crisis of
the mid-1970s marked the transition from
the traditional Fordist mode of industrial
organization to one of time-based competi-
tion (TBC) (Schoenberger 1997; Stalk 1988;
Stalk and Hout 1990). As an industrial para-
digm, the “old,” ideal-type, Fordism was a
system of “assembly-line-based mass produc-
tion” of standardized goods (Asheim 1992).
Production took place in large vertically inte-
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Abstract: The economic crisis of the mid-1970s marked the transition from the
traditional Fordist mode of industrial organization to one of time-based competi-
tion (TBC). It has been postulated that the rise of TBC will lead to an increase in
local and regional production linkages. Part of the argument is that the associated
search for logistical efficiency and the adoption of the just-in-time (JIT) principles
will lead to closer buyer-supplier proximity. In this article, we test the relevance of
this idea in a case study of the microcomputer hardware industry in Ireland and
Scotland. Most of the data were collected during multiple interviews with subsidiaries
of all global microcomputer assemblers with operations in one of the two coun-
tries. The study shows that rather than sourcing locally or regionally, the assem-
blers import the vast majority of their material inputs from regions outside Ireland
and Britain, notably from the Far East, and that the inbound logistics pipelines of
most components involve inventories, often hubbed in local warehouses. Such supply
systems have been interpreted as pseudo-JIT, suboptimal inbound logistics
systems that are organized on traditional Fordist principles. We argue that the logis-
tics systems and the geography of the supply linkages should not be interpreted
this way. Inbound inventories were tightly managed, leading to modest target buffer
levels and high shipment frequencies. Even under JIT supply, the geographic config-
uration of production linkages and the details of logistics systems remain highly
dependent on a range of contextual conditions and component characteristics. The
findings of this study suggest that a strategy of building integrated vertical produc-
tion clusters around subsidiaries of multinational enterprises is no longer suitable
for Ireland and Scotland, at least not in the context of the microcomputer industry.
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grated plants that were owned and centrally
controlled by large, often multinational,
corporations. Rising productivity was
based on mechanization, the pursuit of
internal economies of scale, a detailed divi-
sion of tasks, and the intensification of work
(Amin 1994). Long production runs and
dedicated machinery were intended to mini-
mize downtime. Driven by similar consid-
erations, suppliers produced and delivered
standardized components in large, infre-
quent batches. Price competitiveness was
the most important criterion in the selection
of suppliers (Sayer 1986). Finally, with
regard to the geography of production, the
narrow focus on the minimization of prices,
production costs, and labor costs meant that
the Fordist system was often characterized
by an extreme spatial division of labor and
spaced-out supply chains. Peripheral regions
were incorporated in a dependent way
through branch-plant investment that
contributed little to regional development.
The Fordist methods of work organiza-
tion had reached their limits in terms of
growth in productivity by the 1970s.
Furthermore, owning to its inherent rigidi-
ties, the Fordist system was unable to cater
to modern markets, characterized by the
demand for variety, quality, and respon-
siveness and by shorter product life cycles.
For these reasons, among others, the
economic crisis of the mid-1970s has been
interpreted as a “crisis of Fordism” (Amin
1994; Schoenberger 1997). One idea is
that a resolution of this crisis, if such a
resolution is possible, would require a return
to a more flexible, craft-based mode of
production (see, for example, Piore and
Sabel 1984 on “flexible specialization” and
Storper and Scott 1989 on “flexible accu-
mulation”).
Others have pointed to many firms that
are successfully competing in the new
market environment with new flexible forms
of high-volume production that are blurring
the distinction between craft and mass
production (Jessop 1992; Tomaney 1994).
These firms are not producing standardized
end products, but instead have succeeded
in combining mass production with product
variety and customization. All new high-
volume production firms, in one way or
another, “combine the benefits of economies
of scope and greater flexibility in responding
to consumer demand, which are character-
istic of small batch production, with those
of economies of scale, characteristic of mass
production” (Hudson 1997b, 303). These
ideas are captured in a number of produc-
tion concepts, including lean production
(Womack, Jones, and Roos 1990), mass
customization (Pine 1993), dynamic flexi-
bility (Coriat 1991; Veltz 1991), diversified
quality production (Jessop 1992), and TBC
(Stalk and Hout 1990; Schoenberger 1997).
The TBC model emphasizes that the new
competitive environment and the require-
ments of modern markets have drastically
changed the role of time in competition.
According to its proponents, firms now
compete primarily on the basis of their ability
to compress time in all elements of the value
chain and, beyond that, in the firms’ rela-
tions with upstream and downstream part-
ners. The central focus is on reducing
product development times and order-to-
delivery cycles. This focus, in theory, results
in a highly flexible production system that
offers a combination of fast response,
increased variety, high value, and low cost
(Stalk and Hout 1990).
Schoenberger (1997) postulated that the
rise of TBC will have repercussions for the
geography of production and regional devel-
opment. She depicted a stylized scenario
of “concentrated deconcentration,” in which
a multinational firm creates tightly integrated
production complexes in each of its primary
market regions, including North America,
the European Union, East Asia, and
Southeast Asia. The regional complexes
would include various manufacturing func-
tions, as well as some degree of technical
and strategic responsibility that would allow
the firm to respond to the particular needs
of the individual regional markets.
Schoenberger also postulated that TBC
will lead to a greater proximity between
buyers and their suppliers and an increase
in local and regional production linkages.
The argument basically involves two drivers
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of buyer-supplier proximity: the efficient
exchange of technical information and the
efficient flow of products, or logistical effi-
ciency. With regard to the efficient flow of
products, one of the central targets of TBC
is a reduction of the order-to-delivery cycles
or chain-cycle times (Stalk and Hout
1990). Toward this end, TBC envelops the
just-in-time (JIT) production and supply
principles, which are expected to lead to
close buyer-supplier proximity.
We tested the relevance of these ideas
in a case study of the microcomputer hard-
ware industry in Ireland and Scotland. The
microcomputer industry is here defined as
the industry that produces personal
computers (including laptops and note-
books), workstations, and entry-level servers
that cost less than $100,000 in 2001. It
involves both microcomputer assemblers and
the manufacturers of components and parts.
Companies in this industry have been
portrayed as prime examples of TBC and
JIT supply (Hudson 1997a; “Just-In-Time
Inventories: Combating Foreign Rivals”
1984; Sayer 1986; Morgan 1991). The micro-
computer sector is a good example of an
industry that is facing highly volatile markets
and irregular and unpredictable demand—
characteristics that prove to be central to the
analysis we present later in this article. The
findings concerning the relevance of the first
driver, the efficient exchange of technical
information, have been documented else-
where (van Egeraat and Jacobson 2005; van
Egeraat, Jacobson, and Phelps 2002). This
article focuses on how the logistical consid-
erations have influenced the geography of
production linkages in the industry. Related
studies on the industry (e.g., Angel and
Engstrom 1995; Dedrick and Kraemer 2002)
have tended to focus on the geography of
production networks in the United States
and the Far East. Our study specifically
focused on the production networks of
companies that are located in the European
semiperiphery. Furthermore, Angel and
Engstrom analyzed the role of technical
information exchange and paid no attention
to logistical considerations.
This article focuses strongly on the rele-
vance of the efficiency argument for buyer-
supplier proximity. Less attention is paid
to other aspects of buyer-supplier relation-
ships, notably a shift from producer-driven
to buyer-driven commodity chains (Gereffi
2001) or from supplier to client markets and
the associated shift of relative power among
members of the chains. Whether governance
mechanisms in the microcomputer hardware
industry are really shifting toward buyer-
driven chains is a matter for debate (see, e.g.,
Chen 2002). Nevertheless, power rela-
tions, in general, could have a confounding
effect on the analysis of logistical arrange-
ments, so their influence receives attention
as well.
Most data were collected during inter-
views with general managers, materials
managers, and logistics managers who were
employed by the 11 branded microcomputer
makers in Ireland (Apple, AST, Dell,
Gateway, and Intel) and Scotland (Apricot-
Mitsubishi, Compaq, Digital, IBM, Packard
Bell-NEC, and Sun Microsystems)—from
here on referred to as “the focal companies”
or “the focal plants.” Three rounds of
semistructured and structured interviews
were conducted from 1998 to 2001. Unless
we state otherwise, all of the data presented
here pertain to the situation during the
period 1998 to early 1999. Additional data
were collected through mailed question-
naires that were completed by staff members
at the focal companies and newspaper
research. Finally, telephone interviews were
conducted with staff at a selection of local
supplier firms.
The next section more closely examines
the logic underlying the idea that logistical
considerations in the context of TBC will
drive close buyer-supplier proximity. This
section is followed by an outline of the geog-
raphy of the supply chains of the micro-
computer companies in Ireland and
Scotland. It shows that the focal compa-
nies source the vast majority of material
inputs from regions outside Ireland and
Britain, notably from the Far East. The next
section, which yields insights into the ways
in which the focal companies structured their
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inbound logistics pipelines, provides the
basis for the subsequent analysis of data on
inventory levels, shipment frequencies, and
modes of transport. We focus on whether
the focal companies are still operating subop-
timal inbound logistics systems organized on
traditional Fordist, mass production prin-
ciples, or whether, in line with TBC, the
focal companies have optimal (or, at least,
less suboptimal)1 inbound logistics systems
that take full account of the modern compre-
hensive logistics management principles
underlying TBC. If the latter is the case,
then we will have to conclude that these
principles do not necessarily lead to buyer-
supplier proximity. In the conclusion, we
consider the implications of this point for
industrial policy.
Comprehensive Logistics
Management Principles
One of the central components of TBC is
JIT supply. Textbook “true JIT” (Morris
1989, 1992), “full JIT” (Mair 1992), or “pure
JIT” (Fawcett and Birou 1992) is a logistics
system that is characterized by very low
buffer inventories, near-synchronous
production, and daily delivery of inputs2
directly to the assembly line. The term
sequential JIT has been used for situations
in which suppliers manufacture and deliver
components in the same order as they are
used on their customers’ assembly lines
(Larsson 2000). Such systems are believed
to lead to close buyer-supplier proximity
(Estall 1985; Kenney and Florida 1992; Mair
1992; Mair, Florida, and Kenney 1988; Sayer
1986; Schoenberger 1997). True JIT is often
presented as the optimal supply system.
However, it should really be interpreted as
an extreme outcome in a spectrum of
possible optimal outcomes that are based on
modern comprehensive logistics manage-
ment principles. The explanation requires a
closer look at these principles.
Logistics management systems have
always involved calculating the minimum
required inventory levels of components and
related individual order quantities. In the
old system, the individual order quantities,
or lot sizes, were typically based on a tradi-
tional economic order quantity (EOQ)
formulation (Christopher 1992; McCann
1998). The EOQ model is based on the idea
that it is possible to calculate order quanti-
ties/shipment frequencies involving minimal
“total logistics costs” (TLCs). These TLCs
are the sum of the ordering/setup costs,
the costs of holding inventories, and the costs
of transporting goods. The ordering/setup
costs include the administration costs that
are involved in organizing an individual
purchase, plus the labor costs involved in
setting up machinery. The inventory holding
costs were traditionally reduced to interest
costs. The EOQ was derived by balancing
these cost components.3
The modern comprehensive logistics
management principles that underlie JIT
involve a more inclusive interpretation of
inventory holding costs. According to
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1 We do not prove that the logistical solutions
reported in this article are perfectly optimal.
However, the data show that the companies have
adopted the modern comprehensive logistics
management principles and that their systems
are at least less suboptimal than the systems
that are organized on traditional Fordist princi-
ples.
2 The criteria are arbitrary. Some authors have
reserved the term true JIT for cases that involve
multiple deliveries a day (Morris 1989, 1992).
3 The traditional formulation of the EOQ is
expressed as Q* =  2mS, where Q* is the EOQ, Ic
m is the quantity of input per period, S is the
ordering/setup costs of conducting each indi-
vidual shipment, I is the rate of interest, and c
is the source price per unit of input (McCann
1998). With his broader logistics costs model,
McCann (1996, 1998) showed how total input
logistics costs are generally a positive function
of transport costs and, thus, of distance.
Correspondingly, the EOQ is dependent on
transport costs and distance. Integration of this idea,
and assuming shipment economies of scale, leads
to the following formulation for the EOQ
Qi* =  2m(S + adi), where a is movementIc
costs per mile and d is delivery distance.
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McCann (1998), compared to the traditional
models, two extra cost factors are consid-
ered and are believed to represent a signif-
icant part of the inventory holding costs:
space costs and total quality costs (TQCs).
The space costs of inventory are the space
and space handling costs of storage and
warehouse space, which are made up of
the land costs and the labor costs involved
in inventory-handling operations. The TQCs
are the combined costs of lost market
share owing to the poor quality and relia-
bility of the final product and the costs of
final-quality control administration, which
are the costs of expediting materials, the
costs of lost orders, back-orders, scrap, and
rejects. The greater the average volume of
inventory held, the greater the risk that faults
in individual components will go undetected
during the production process—the greater
the quality costs.
These cost components were not included
in traditional Western purchasing tech-
niques, which, as a consequence, underes-
timated the real costs of holding inventories.
In other words, the adoption of the compre-
hensive logistics management principles
creates an incentive to reduce further the
average volume of inventories by reducing
the shipment size and increasing the ship-
ment frequency. In modern quality-compet-
itive markets, the significance of TQCs and
space costs may be so great that the EOQ
tends toward zero, that is, lot sizes of one.4
However, if shipment sizes go down and
shipment frequencies go up, the transport
cost and ordering/setup cost components of
the TLCs will rise. There are two ways to
prevent an increase in transport and
ordering/setup costs. First, firms can work
to reduce the ordering/setup costs of
conducting each individual shipment by
streamlining the order-entry system, for
example. Second, and more important for
the present discussion, firms can attempt to
reduce the input delivery distance. This is
the basic logic behind the JIT-proximity
argument (Mair 1992; McCann 1996, 1998).
The idea that there are forces that drive
customer-supplier proximity is obviously not
new. Even the traditional logistics models
and the traditional way of calculating the
EOQ could lead to a situation in which the
transport costs and the interest costs of
holding inventories would drive customer-
supplier co-location. In fact, one could
consider buyer-supplier co-location to be
the “normal” situation. It is only because of
issues such as differences in labor costs
between locations, economies of scale in
component production, and a whole range
of reasons related to history, the techno-
logical capabilities of a region’s suppliers,
and locational inertia, that customers use
suppliers located in other regions. With
the modern comprehensive logistics
management principles that underlie JIT,
the difference is that the forces that tend
toward buyer-supplier proximity are stronger
because of a greater appreciation of the role
of space costs and TQCs.
However, the specifics of the logistical
arrangements and the effects on linkage
distance remain dependent on a range of
component characteristics and contextual
conditions. Paraphrasing Christopher (1992),
companies still have to make a range of
“trade-offs” in working to improve the
cost-effectiveness of the total supply chain—
the ultimate goal of any logistics system.
Here, we briefly consider the four issues that
we investigated in the course of the study:
differences in labor costs among production
locations; the value, volume, and weight of
components; the minimum efficient scale
(MES) of component production; and
component variety. Other issues, notably
superior technological capability and loca-
tional inertia, are not discussed, since,
because they were clearly less relevant for
our case, they were not specifically addressed
in the study.
Differences in labor costs among regions,
as reflected in the price of components,
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4 Taking account of the space costs and TQC,
the new formulation of the EOQ becomes
Qi* =  2m(S + adi), where s is the logistics spaceq + s + Ici
cost coefficient and q expresses the impact of the
TQC. Thus, the higher the value of s and q, the
closer the EOQ will be to zero (McCann 1998).
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are very important. More-distant suppliers
may be able to compete with lower prices
because of cheaper labor costs. If these price
advantages outweigh the efficiencies gained
by co-location, then a firm may operate
JIT supply over longer distances (McCann
1998) or operate logistics systems that
diverge substantially from the prototypical
true JIT system.
Another often-cited issue is related to the
value and bulk or weight of individual
components. The incentive for increasing
shipment frequency, decreasing order size,
and decreasing linkage distance will be
greater for high-value components than for
low-value components (Christopher 1992),
ceteris paribus, since components with a
high value will incur much-higher interest
and insurance costs. Likewise, the incentives
for increasing shipment frequency and
decreasing linkage distance are greater for
physically bulky and heavy components than
for small and light components, ceteris
paribus (Lubben 1988; McKinnon 1997),
since bulky components will incur higher
space costs, whereas the transport costs are
higher for both bulky and heavy compo-
nents.
The MES of component production also
impinges on the logistical arrangements and
linkage distance. Production at the MES
often means that manufacturers of compo-
nents need to supply several customers,
which can mean that suppliers are located
at considerable distances from some of these
customers (Bordenave and Lung 1996; Jones
and North 1991; McKinnon 1997; Milne
1990; Morris 1992; Schamp 1991).
Finally, the incentives for increasing the
shipment frequency and proximity will be
stronger for component categories involving
a high variety of options (e.g., different colors
or styles) than for more-standardized compo-
nent categories because the greater the
variety of options within a component
category, the higher the inventory holding
costs involved in stockpiling a certain level
of finished components in all possible
permutations (Christopher 1992; van Hoek
1998; Bordenave and Lung 1996), particu-
larly in situations of highly unpredictable
demand. Therefore, the greater the variety
of options, the greater the incentive to delay
the final assembly of component materials
into finished components. The greater the
delay in the final assembly, the greater the
frequency of shipments, and the greater the
drive for buyer-supplier proximity.
All these component characteristics and
the difference in labor costs among regions
mean that the adoption of comprehensive
logistics management principles can have a
variety of outcomes, involving both local and
overseas sources and a combination of
delivery methods (Lubben 1988). At one end
of the spectrum, the pipeline of some
components will be organized along the lines
of a true JIT system, with suppliers located
in close proximity to the customer. Because
of technical developments in transport and
logistics, even such a true JIT system does
not necessarily involve buyer-supplier co-
location. Indeed, some companies operate
such systems with suppliers located in other
countries or even other continents (Clarke
and Beany 1993; Glasmeier and McCluskey
1987; Lamming 1993; McCann 1998; Milne
1990). However, these examples are the
exceptions. Frequency, distance, speed, reli-
ability, and the cost of transport are inter-
related issues that have to be traded off
against one another (McKinnon 1997). In
general, the literature suggests maximum
workable distances for true JIT supply
ranging from 30 to 150 miles (Estall 1985;
Kenney and Florida 1992; Mair 1992; Mair,
Florida, and Kenney 1988; Sayer 1986;
Schoenberger 1997).
Alternatively, the adoption of compre-
hensive logistics management principles may
lead to a “JIT-type” supply system (Crowley
1996) involving slightly less-frequent ship-
ments and slightly higher buffer inventories
and suppliers that are somewhat farther
away. In such instances, “the meaning of JIT
delivery starts to change” (Lubben 1988,
192). At the other end of the spectrum of
outcomes, the pipelines of components may
involve even less frequent shipments, still
higher (though tightly managed) buffer
inventory levels, and suppliers that are
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located at great distances (Fawcett and Birou
1992).
Geography of Production
Linkages
This section outlines the sources of the
parts and components that are used by the
11 focal companies. Interviewees provided
the names of their suppliers as well as the
location of manufacturing. The precise detail
of the geographic configuration of the
supplier networks differed from company to
company. However, great commonalities
existed, especially with respect to the
regional supply situation. The main area of
difference was the location of the mother-
board/backpanel suppliers. The geographic
origin of parts and components is summa-
rized in Table 1. For more detailed data on
individual companies, see van Egeraat,
Turok, and Jacobson (1999) and van Egeraat
(2002).
The vast majority of components and parts
were imported from regions outside Ireland
and Britain, notably from the Far East
and, to a lesser extent, the United States.
The only items that were significantly
sourced in Ireland and/or Scotland were
enclosures, motherboards/backpanels
(mainly from Scotland), network cards (from
Ireland only), non-English-language
keyboards, digital/printed media, accessory
kits,5 cables/interconnect, and packaging
material. Furthermore, England and
Wales figured, to a small extent, in the area
of monitors, while England also played a role
in the supply of motherboards. However,
most of these components were imported
from other regions as well. Thus, the
majority of motherboards/backpanels,
network cards, cables, keyboards, and moni-
tors were manufactured in other regions,
notably in the Far East. Only enclosures,
packaging, media, kits, and non-English-
language keyboards were sourced mainly
from suppliers in Ireland or Scotland.
The local supply networks of the 5 micro-
computer assemblers in Ireland included 47
(mainly foreign-owned) companies operating
57 component plants. The local supply
networks of the 6 focal companies in
Scotland included 49 (mainly foreign-owned)
companies operating 51 plants. However,
the actual production activities in many
plants were very limited or added limited
value to the product. Apart from limited
digital printing activity, 11 kitting plants
merely packaged media and other language-
specific parts into a box. Similarly, 5
keyboard localization plants merely laser
printed (non-English-language) keyboards
that were manufactured overseas. Finally,
the production activities of the turnkey
suppliers that were involved in rework activ-
ities added little value.
Ten focal companies provided an estimate
of their expenditures on locally (Ireland or
Scotland) manufactured components as a
percentage of their total expenditures. They
also provided figures for the share of compo-
nents that were sourced in Ireland and
Britain together. At the time that the inter-
views were conducted, on average, 10
percent of the parts and components that
were sourced by the focal companies in
Ireland were manufactured in Ireland
(ranging from 7 percent to 12 percent). The
items that were manufactured in Britain
accounted for another 4 percent, on average
(ranging from 0 to 9 percent). With regard
to the focal companies in Scotland, on
average, 7 percent of the material inputs was
manufactured in Scotland (ranging from 2
percent to 9 percent). The items that were
manufactured in the rest of Britain and
Ireland made up another 9 percent (ranging
from 3 percent to 10 percent).
The figures on local sourcing are substan-
tially lower than those that were presented
in other studies that were based on data
collected by the industrial development
agencies in Ireland and Scotland. Turok
(1997) reported that in 1995, the 16 largest
foreign-owned electronics companies in
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connectors were typically packaged in a “country”
or “accessory” kit. Some focal companies subcon-
tracted the packaging of these kits to local supply-
chain managers that were also responsible for
sourcing the items.
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Scotland (including all the main computer
assemblers) sourced 21 percent of their total
purchases (excluding electronic components,
intercompany trading, and services) from
Scotland. In Ireland, local sourcing figures
are collected by Forfas as part of the annual
Irish Economy Expenditure (IEE) survey.
Data on four of the five microcomputer focal
companies extracted from this survey
provided an average local sourcing figure of
28 percent for 1998 (van Egeraat 2002).
The discrepancy between the figures that
are based on the surveys conducted by the
industrial development agencies and our
figures is partly explained by our less-
inclusive definition of local sourcing. Thus,
the IEE figures include expenditures for
items that were bought from local supply-
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Table 1
Summary of Geographic Sources of Material Inputs of Focal Companies, 1998–1999
Material Input
Enclosures and racks (high-volume models)
Enclosures and racks (less current models); screws,
fasteners, and other c-class items
Motherboards, backpanels, and riser cards
Microprocessors
Floppy drives, CD-ROM drives, CD-RW drives, DVD
drives, low-end technology high-capacity disk and
tape drives, batteries and AC adapters (for porta-
bles), digital cameras, hard disk drives, speakers and
microphones, docking stations, keyboards, mice,
joysticks, low-end power supplies, portable
computers (contract manufacturing)
High-end high-capacity disk and tape drives, high-end
power supply
Heat sinks, cooling fans
Modems and network components
Graphics, video, and sound cards; printers; other semi-
conductors; capacitors and resistors; memory
Cables and interconnect
Displays
Media
Accessory kits, packaging material, subassembly and
rework services, printing of non-English-language
keyboard models 
Complete computer systems (contract manufacturing)
Etched boards, interconnect, jumpers, and switches
Note: For the sake of brevity, many of the details in this table have been omitted. The complete table is available
from the first author on request.
Source: Company interviews.
Main Geographic Sources
Mainly local and, to a lesser extent, the Far East
The United States and, to a lesser extent, local 
For most focal companies: mainly the Far East and, to
a lesser extent, the United States; for two focal
companies: mainly Scotland and England 
Mainly Southeast Asia, small amounts from Ireland;
for proprietary technology: the United States 
Far East
The United States, the Far East, Europe, and England
Mainly the Far East; to a lesser extent, the United
States, England, and Germany
Mainly the Far East and the United States, although
four suppliers were manufacturing in Ireland
Mainly the Far East
Mainly the Far East and, to a lesser extent, Ireland
and Scotland
Mainly the Far East; Wales and England for a few
selected models
Printed manuals: mainly Ireland and, to a lesser
extent, Scotland; CD replication: Ireland, Scotland,
Wales, Germany, and the United States; wrapping
of digital and printed media: local
Local
Mainly local, England, and Taiwan
Mainly the Far East and the United States
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chain managers but manufactured in other
regions, as well as expenditures for complete
systems that were manufactured by contract
manufacturers with local operations. We did
not consider these items to be vertical
production linkages and hence excluded
them from the data we collected during
the company interviews.
Inbound Pipeline Strategies
and Structures
The focal companies had always had a mix
of logistical arrangements. Before the mid-
1990s, a small part of the inputs was manu-
factured and supplied on a virtually true JIT
basis, involving minimal buffer inventories.
In fact, Apple had implemented true JIT
supply systems for selected components as
early as 1983 (“Just-In-Time Inventories:
Combating Foreign Rivals” 1984). However,
the supply chains of most other components
still involved larger buffer stocks, in most
cases stored in customers’ warehouses as
customer-owned inventory. These compo-
nents were typically supplied on the basis of
a push model, with vendors reacting to rela-
tively inflexible purchase orders, detailing
a fixed amount of product and a fixed
delivery date on which customers had to
accept the material. Supplies could either
come direct from the suppliers’ manufac-
turing facilities or be delivered through the
suppliers’ regional warehouses.
Since the mid-1990s, the strategy of all
focal companies has been shifting toward a
“hubbing” system. In a hubbing system,
suppliers that are not able to supply their
customers directly from their manufacturing
facilities within a certain lead time are
requested to hold an agreed minimum
amount of inventory at a location near
their customers—the “hub.” The customers
very frequently pull from these hubs, either
their exact material requirements or the
amount necessary to replenish minimal on-
site buffers. The suppliers are responsible
for maintaining sufficient inventories in
the hubs and hold title to these invento-
ries. Customers own the material only
from the moment they pull it from the hubs.
Suppliers produce and deliver on the basis
of very flexible purchase orders, often
“blanket purchase orders.”
Some of the focal companies pulled mate-
rial from a multitude of hubs, individually
organized by the various suppliers (i.e.,
vendor hubs). However, there was an
increasing trend toward consolidating the
hubbed inventories of multiple suppliers into
one or two superhubs, which significantly
reduced the complexity of the pull system.
Some focal companies managed their own
superhubs. However, in most cases, these
superhubs were owned and managed by
third-party-logistics (3PL) providers that
offered integrated logistics services. These
“3PL hubs” could serve several focal compa-
nies.
The delivery lead-time requirements of
individual focal companies varied from 24
hours to as low as 1 hour. Most 3PL hubs
were therefore located close to the focal
companies (see Figure 1), and some focal
companies had organized hubbing facili-
ties on-site. Such proximity allowed compa-
nies to pull materials multiple times a day,
which led to extremely low inbound inven-
tory levels on the customers’ books. It is this
hubbing system that partly explains the
discrepancy between the use of overseas
component sources and the high inventory
turns published by some of the focal compa-
nies (Casey 1997; Oram 1997).
Apart from hubbing, the focal companies
still used a range of other pipeline structures,
including true JIT. But most structures
had one thing in common with the hubbing
system: they involved locally stored inven-
tories on the suppliers’ books. Thus, focal
companies made increasing use of supply-
chain-management companies that not only
organized the logistics of components, but
actually bought and held title to components
until they were delivered to the assembly
plants. Items that were sourced in this way
could include many c-class items, cables and
interconnect material, mice, keyboards, and
media. From an inbound logistics point of
view, there are great parallels between
receiving supplies in this way and from a
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local hub. In both cases, the customer very
frequently pulls from agreed buffers that are
located in close proximity and are owned by
the supplier/supply-chain manager.
In many cases, local suppliers were
requested to hold (at their own premises)
minimum buffers of finished goods at levels
that were similar to those requested from
suppliers delivering through the hubs.
Customers did not have to take the material
and did not own it until the moment they
pulled it from the local suppliers. Again, in
these cases, there was not much difference
between a hub and a local supplier.
Through the hubbing system and most of
the other pipeline arrangements, focal
companies reduced their inbound invento-
ries to a minimum by requesting suppliers
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Figure 1. Location of main third-party logistics hubs in Ireland and Scotland, 1998–1999.
Source: Company interviews.
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to provide JIT deliveries from finished
component inventories, stored in local ware-
houses. Such supply systems are typically
referred to as “apparent JIT” (Lamming
1993; Ryan 1997) or “pseudo JIT” (Hudson
1994). It has been suggested that these
systems are suboptimal and hold no benefit
for the supply chain as a whole, since the
costs of inventory remain in the system
(Lamming 1993). Suppliers are allegedly
forced to “eat” inventories (Morris, Munday,
and Wilkinson 1993; Roper, Prabhu, and van
Zwanenberg 1997), and the burden of inven-
tory is simply transferred from the customers
to the suppliers. However, the use of hubs,
in itself, does not necessarily mean that the
supply system is suboptimal. The fact that
the supply system diverges from the proto-
typical true JIT picture does not mean that
the modern comprehensive logistics
management principles are not appreciated.
To determine the optimality of the supply
chain, one requires data on the actual size
of the inventories, the shipment frequen-
cies, and the mode of transport. These
data are presented in the next section.
However, additional information on the
details of the hubbing arrangements/
contracts can cast some light on the issue.
With regard to the idea of suppliers being
forced to eat inventories, all but one of the
interviewees indicated that suppliers were
compensated for hubbing. The focal compa-
nies were paying more than the standard
price for hubbed components. Furthermore,
hubbing contracts could involve different
liability clauses, which meant that the risk
of obsolescence was not always entirely
transferred to the supplier. Thus, although
in the case of many components, the focal
companies were not liable to take the inven-
tories in the hub at any stage, in other cases,
particularly those of customized compo-
nents, the focal companies had to take the
material in the pipeline after a certain
period. Anyway, the risk of obsolescence of
hubbed materials was generally kept to a
minimum by the intensive sharing of infor-
mation on inventories and forecasts of
demand.
So if suppliers are compensated for main-
taining inventories in the hubs and the focal
companies have to bear the cost of inven-
tories anyway, the question arises: what
drives the rise of hubbing? There are several
advantages of hubbing. First, a hubbing
system, as opposed to a system in which each
individual focal company carries its own
inventories, provides economies of scale in
the management of industry-standard inven-
tories and allows total inventories to be
reduced, since inventories in the hubs can
be, and are, switched among various focal
companies. Second, most focal companies
were extremely focused on indicators of
short-term performance, such as return on
investment, and hubbing allowed them to
improve some of these indicators. As one
interviewee put it: “[our company] is a public
company; . . . the first thing a Street analyst
will look for is our inventory and our turns.
Obviously this is a huge opportunity” (inter-
view with the operations manager, Gateway
EMEA, 1999).
The use of 3PL hubs creates additional
advantages over the use of vendor hubs.
Both customers and suppliers can tap into
the full set of integrated services offered
by the 3PL providers. The bigger 3PL
providers have developed or acquired core
technologies and competencies in the area
of logistics and supply-chain management,
notably sophisticated electronic data inter-
change, satellite tracking, radio-frequency
scanning, and automated customs handling
systems.
Logistical Efficiency
The focal companies imported the vast
majority of components and parts from
regions outside Ireland and Britain, notably
from the Far East, and the pipelines of most
components involved inventories, often
hubbed in local warehouses. This section
discusses whether this situation reflects a
suboptimal inbound logistics system that is
organized on traditional Fordist, mass
production principles, or whether it came
about in the context of a more efficient
inbound logistics system, taking account of
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the modern comprehensive logistics
management principles underlying JIT and
TBC.
The interviews with the focal companies
made clear that the costs of holding inven-
tories in the inbound pipeline were well
appreciated in all the focal companies.
This point was reflected in the high level
of control that the focal companies kept over
the inbound inventories and pipelines, as is
illustrated by the following comment:
I give [the suppliers] my material requirements
plan every week for that product, and I expect
them to manage the chain between them
and the hub. I expect them to turn it up, down,
slow it, fasten it, and manage it, so that I always
have 10 days [worth of inventory] in the hub.
. . . We run queries here every day by part
number, which sends out an exception report
which shows me what suppliers have less than
10 days. And the buyers call them. And it
also shows us what we have too much of.
And we than proactively take actions twice a
week. . . . All the vendors are on-line to Irish
Express Cargo [the 3PL hub]. All the vendors
have the same kind of contact. That is a
criterion that Gateway gives. (Interview with
the operations manager, Gateway Ireland,
September 1999)
To gain insights into how tightly the
inbound inventories were managed, we
asked the focal companies to provide a set
of key logistics data for individual compo-
nents from the various source regions. Table
2 summarizes these data. The first column
lists the various material inputs. With the
exception of data on microprocessors and
memory, no data are presented on the
components for the board assembly lines.
Only four focal companies were assem-
bling limited amounts of printed circuit
boards on site. The second column lists the
target buffer or inventory levels (the average
for the respondent companies) that the
companies tried to maintain for the various
components. The data on target buffer levels
represent buffers that are kept at hubs,
suppliers’ local/regional manufacturing facil-
ities, warehouses of the focal companies,
supply-chain managers, or a combination of
these facilities. The data do not include the
(small) inventories that are kept at the plants
of the focal companies in the context of
hubbing or true JIT supply. In most cases,
the size of these on-site buffers was minimal.
Finally, the third column lists the target
number of days between shipments from the
location of manufacturing into the main
buffer (the average for the respondent
companies). This is a measure of the ship-
ment frequency.
The key logistics data paint a picture of
tightly managed inbound inventories with
modest target buffer levels and high ship-
ment frequencies. To some extent, the target
buffer levels for individual component
pipelines varied, depending on a number of
interrelated issues that are discussed later
in this section. However, all of the compa-
nies worked with a generic figure for target
inbound inventory that applied to most parts
and components. All but two focal compa-
nies worked toward a buffer of 10 days (of
the forecasted demand) for most of their
material inputs. One managed its invento-
ries even more tightly, working toward a 5-
day generic buffer level and applying a
higher shipment frequency than other
companies for most of its material inputs.
The second worked toward a mixture of
10-day and 5-day target buffer levels.
Broken down by geographic origin, most
components that were manufactured in
the Far East and the Americas involved
target buffers of 8 to 10 days and weekly to
biweekly shipment frequencies (the aver-
ages for the respondent companies). For
most materials from these regions, the
typical mode of transport was an airplane,6
leading to relatively small inventories caught
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6 An airplane was the typical preferred mode
of transport for the following items: micro-
processors; memory; partly integrated portables;
autoloaders; AC adapters; hard disk drives; CD-
ROM drives; zip drives; sound, video, and
graphics cards; DVD drives; modem and network
cards; motherboards; riser cards; mice; screws;
and fasteners.
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up in transit and relatively small fluctuations
in the actual inbound inventory levels. Most
components that were manufactured in
Europe again involved target buffer levels
of between 8 to 10 days, but shipments were
more frequent—ranging from one to five
times a week. All of the European materials
were trucked by road/ferry, and the delivery
lead time was generally less than 24 hours.
Finally, regarding material inputs that
were manufactured in the United Kingdom
and Ireland, although a number of compo-
nents involved very low target buffer levels—
as low as two days (the average for the
respondent companies)—most components
involved buffer levels that were comparable
to those that were applicable to items manu-
factured in other regions. Table 2 does not
show shipment frequencies for locally
sourced components, since, in most cases,
the main buffers were positioned at the
suppliers’ manufacturing facilities and were
fed directly from the manufacturing lines.
The focal companies typically pulled mate-
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Table 2 
Summary of Key Logistics Data (Averages for Focal Companies)
Target
Buffer Levels Target Number of Days
(Days) Between Shipments
Material Inputs from the Far East and the Americas
Microprocessors 04 02
Flat-panel monitors 05 05
Memory 08 03
LCD displays 08 04
Partly integrated portables 10 04
Tape backup/autoloaders, AC adapters, hard disk drives, CRT 8–10 5–10
monitors, small plastic metal parts, floppy drives, CD-ROM 
drives, CD-RW drives, combo drives, zip drives, docking 
stations, joysticks, scanners, server racks, sound/video/
graphics cards, power supplies, DVD drives, modem/network 
cards, enclosures, motherboards/backpanels, English-language 
keyboards, printers, enclosures for portables, heat sinks, 
microphones, cooling fans, riser cards
Batteries for portables, speakers, mice, power cables 13–14 6–10
Other cables 15 11
Screws and fasteners 35 40
Material Inputs from Europe
Power supplies 05 02
Motherboards/backpanels 10 01
CRT monitors, tape backup/autoloaders, memory, enclosures 8–10 2–4
for portables, cooling fans, hard disk drives, other cables
Printers, sound/video/graphics cards 10 5
Material Inputs from Ireland and the United Kingdom
Packaging; non-English-language keyboards, country kits 02
CD-ROMs (wrapped), printed media (wrapped) 04
Heat sinks, enclosures 05
Hard disk drives, server racks 06
Small plastic metal parts, modem/network cards, motherboards/ 9–10
backpanels, power supplies, CRT monitors, printers, Flexcircuit
Printed labels, power cables, other cables 13
Source: Company interviews.
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rials from these suppliers on a daily basis
or even more frequently.7 When the main
buffers were not positioned at the suppliers’
manufacturing facilities, the hubs or the
customers’ facilities were typically supplied
very frequently—often daily or every second
day. The main exceptions included
modem/network cards, which were typically
shipped on a weekly or biweekly basis.
Thus, the general picture is one of modest
inbound target buffer levels and high ship-
ment frequencies.8 Although modest
compared to the traditional Western logis-
tics systems, these inbound target buffer
levels were slightly higher than one would
expect on the basis of comprehensive
logistics management principles alone.
The market conditions that the focal compa-
nies faced, in combination with their produc-
tion strategy, provide an explanation for why
the inbound buffer levels were not less than
optimal.
All the focal companies offered a great
variety of product configurations, often
customized to individual orders, in combi-
nation with extremely short order lead
times—typically, the companies applied a
target order lead time of fewer than five
days. At the same time, the companies aimed
to minimize the inventories of finished
computer systems. These objectives are fully
consistent with textbook TBC (Hise 1995;
Stalk and Hout 1990). All focal companies
addressed this combination of objectives
with a built-to-order (BTO) (Schroeder
1993) production strategy for the majority
of their output. The focal companies gener-
ally did not build systems to stock. Instead,
computer assembly activities usually started
only after a customer’s order was received.
The problem was that the focal compa-
nies were facing strongly fluctuating and
unpredictable demand. In such an envi-
ronment, a BTO strategy, in combination
with very short lead times, results in strongly
fluctuating and unpredictable demand from
the final assembly on upstream functions.
Although a JIT manufacturing system is
designed to deal with small fluctuations in
demand from the final assembly, it cannot
deal with highly fluctuating and unpre-
dictable demand, since such demand brings
the danger of inefficient use of labor and
machinery upstream and the buildup of in-
process inventories (Sayer 1986). In the
factories of the focal companies, this
problem was partly solved by a reduction
of the number of separate phases in the
production process. Production typically
involved a very short uninterrupted
sequence of system assembly, software
downloading, testing, and packing with no
in-process buffers. In a sense, the first
upstream activity to be encountered was
component production, virtually all of which
took place outside the boundaries of the
plant at the component suppliers. The
problem of zero productivity of workers was
addressed with numerical labor flexibility.
However, as the first upstream function,
the suppliers were confronted with a
highly irregular and unpredictable sequence
of pulls by the focal companies. In such a
situation, the virtual elimination of buffer
inventories on the basis of the comprehen-
sive logistics management principles would
lead to an inefficient use of labor at the
suppliers or an increased risk of stock-out.
A BTO production system with short order
lead times in an environment of erratic final
demand simply requires certain buffers
between the suppliers and the manufac-
turing lines of the customer, except in situ-
ations of extremely short manufacturing
cycles at the suppliers. All this is totally
consistent with the comprehensive logis-
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7 Thus, most enclosures, racks, heat sinks,
configured hard disk drives, and cables that were
manufactured in Ireland or the United Kingdom
were pulled daily or even more frequently from
buffers that were positioned at the suppliers.
Similarly, country kits, wrapped media, non-
English-language keyboards, and packaging were
generally pulled daily or even more frequently
from very small (true JIT) buffers that were kept
at the suppliers’ premises.
8 The figures should be compared to the
traditional Western logistics systems during the
1970s, in which it was not uncommon for compo-
nents like processors to be delivered every two
to three months and to be transported by ship
(personal communication, Dr. Philip McCann).
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tics management principles underlying JIT
and TBC. In effect, the focal companies
were simply trading off the costs of inbound
pipeline inventories against the loss of
market share and revenue because of stock-
out.9
The same requirements of the BTO
production system partly explain why the
supply pipelines of components that were
manufactured in Ireland, the United
Kingdom, and Europe often involved similar
target buffer levels as those that applied to
inputs that were manufactured in the Far
East or the Americas. Many of these compo-
nents involved target buffer levels of 5 to 10
days. A number of items that were manu-
factured in Ireland or the United Kingdom
tended to involve lower target buffer levels
of (finished) components. However, in most
of these cases, the suppliers were committed
to holding the balance of the generic target
levels in the form of unfinished or noncon-
figured components while the final assembly
or configuration process was made extremely
short.
For example, four focal companies that
received hard disks from Quantum in
Ireland worked toward relatively low
target levels of fully configured/preassem-
bled hard disks. However, Quantum was
committed to holding the balance of the 10-
days’ generic target buffer level in noncon-
figured form, while the configuration cycle
was very short and added minimal value.
Three other focal companies applied the
generic target buffer levels for finished hard
disks.
To reiterate, there is abundant evidence
that the inbound inventories and logistics
pipelines were tightly managed. What can
also be shown is that the impact of contex-
tual conditions and component character-
istics on the way companies managed their
inbound logistics and the geography of the
supply linkages was in line with the compre-
hensive logistics management principles. In
the following paragraphs, we show the
empirical importance of the four main issues
that we introduced at the theoretical level.
It is essential to note that in all cases, the
eventual outcome was the result of a
complex tradeoff among a variety of compo-
nent characteristics and contextual condi-
tions. Therefore, the eventual outcome does
not always directly reflect the importance of
an individual factor. Moreover, the charac-
teristics of some components, notably moni-
tors, were such that companies had a choice
of different supply-chain solutions, any one
of which would have been equally effi-
cient.
Regional Differences in Labor Costs.
Regional differences in labor costs remained
a strong force against a reduction of the
linkage distance. The interviewees stated
that producers in other regions, particularly
in the Far East, could offer material inputs
at a substantially lower price than could
producers in Ireland or the United Kingdom,
mainly because of far lower wage rates and
high flexibility of the labor force, but also
because of currency exchange rates. To
attain total supply-chain cost-effectiveness,
companies balanced the efficiencies in logis-
tics that were gained by using local suppliers
against material cost-price advantages that
were gained by using suppliers in low-
wage regions. In many cases, the more
efficient solution involved suppliers that
were located in the Far East. As one inter-
viewee noted:
It [the reason for not sourcing monitors locally]
is basically an argument between the actual
unit cost and the actual component part in
terms of labor content, etc. So if labor content
is a high proportion of the unit cost, then it
makes sense to manufacture that in a low labor
cost arena. . . . So you take into account the
differential between labor content and the
actual transport cost, your [inventory] financing
costs, and money while on the sea, etc., etc.
(Interview with the logistics manager, Apple
Computer Ireland, December 2000)
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of combining JIT principles, global sourcing, and
BTO production for a volatile market in regard
to the logistics operations at Bose’s speaker plant
in the United States.
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Value, Volume, and Weight of
Components. Also in line with the compre-
hensive logistics management principles was
the fact that the inventories of components
with a high unit value were the most tightly
managed. In regard to material inputs that
were manufactured in the Far East and
the Americas, the inventories of high-value
microprocessors, flat-panel monitors, and
memory tended to be managed the most
tightly (see Table 2). For example, on
average, the focal companies and their
suppliers worked toward microprocessor
inventory levels that fluctuated between four
and six days. The high value of these compo-
nents led to a higher shipment frequency,
which theoretically should have increased
the tendency toward proximity. However,
this force toward proximity was simply
outweighed by the labor-cost savings and
exchange-rate advantages involved in
producing these items in the Far East, in
combination with the relatively low costs
involved in transporting these items
frequently by air. On the other hand, the
inventories of items with a low unit value,
such as mice, cables, screws, and printed
labels incurred limited inventory-holding
costs and were managed the least tightly.
The effect of the bulkiness of individual
components is most clearly illustrated by
packaging material. Packaging material,
although of a low unit value, required much
warehouse space, thereby incurring
extremely high inventory-holding costs.
Therefore, packaging tended to be sourced
locally on a true JIT basis involving buffer
levels of fewer than one to two days and one
or more shipments a day. In this case, the
characteristic of bulkiness weighed stronger
than the characteristic of low unit value,
resulting in true JIT supply.
The bulkiness and weight of the compo-
nents also had a more indirect effect on
the logistics management and the geography
of the supply linkages—through their impli-
cations for the mode of transport. Most
material inputs that were manufactured in
the Far East or the Americas were typi-
cally transported by airplane, which led to
low in-transit inventories and low fluctua-
tions in the target buffer inventories. The
interviewees mentioned transit times typi-
cally ranging from three to five days,
including time lost at customs on both sides.
However, airfreight rates rise steeply for
components with a high physical volume
or weight, with the result that for many
components, airfreight is simply not an
option on a continuous basis.
The alternative was ocean freight. The
downside of ocean freight is that, compared
to airfreight, it involves substantial in-transit
inventories. The interviewees typically
mentioned transit times of four to five weeks
in the case of ocean freight from the Far
East and two to three weeks from the United
States. Furthermore, ocean freight involves
larger fluctuations in the actual inbound
inventory levels than does airfreight, even
though the target buffer levels may be
similar. In spite of these downsides, for many
components with lower value-to-weight or
value-to-volume ratios, the outcome of the
trade-off of all factors was sourcing in the
Far East and shipment by sea. Thus, power
supplies, cooling fans, heat sinks, CRT moni-
tors, keyboards, joysticks, microphones, scan-
ners, speakers, printers, power cables, and
enclosures that were sourced in the Far East
were typically transported by ship. The
downsides of ocean freight were reduced by
using different ocean-freight services that
offered a range of transit times and by occa-
sionally using airfreight services.
In other cases, the combination of compo-
nent characteristics and differences in
regional labor costs/exchange-rate advan-
tages led to the use of local or regional
suppliers. For example, most focal compa-
nies sourced enclosures from local
suppliers.10 Sourcing bulky enclosures in the
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volume enclosure models from the Far East,
because of the relatively limited volumes
required—volumes that did not warrant the costs
of developing a local source and the cost of a
second tool. Two companies that used imported
enclosures were in the process of contracting a
local supplier. Less-current enclosure models and
server racks were often imported from the United
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Far East incurred high inventory-holding
costs because of the space costs of local ware-
housing and high in-transit inventories that
were associated with ocean freight. This
strong force for proximity was not offset by
the labor-cost savings associated with
production in the Far East.
MES of Component Production. MES
explains some of the detail in the geographic
configuration at the national and regional
levels. Components, such as country kits,
packaging, and services like keyboard
localization, can be produced or offered effi-
ciently at a relatively low scale that requires
only one customer. This allowed suppliers
to set up relatively small operations in
close proximity to individual customers,
often in the same town or city. The produc-
tion of motherboards, monitors, enclosures,
and higher-end technology components
involves a higher MES that requires a level
of business that can exceed that offered by
one or a few individual microcomputer
companies. As a result, the larger operations
of these suppliers tended to be located at
greater distances from at least some of their
customers, often in a different country on
the British Isles.
Component Variety. The variety of
options per component category was a
relevant issue as well. The research showed
that the components with a high variety of
options—country kits, shrink-wrapped
media, non-English-language keyboard
models, and the customer-configured hard
disk drives of Quantum—were indeed
produced on a true JIT or virtually true
JIT basis, generally by local suppliers.
Holding standard target buffer levels of these
components in all their possible configura-
tions and languages would greatly increase
the inventory holding costs. The local
supplier facilities were involved in the
delayed or postponed final assembly or
configuration activities, while they were
generally committed to holding higher buffer
levels of unfinished or nonconfigured
components, often produced in other
regions.
Clearly, component characteristics,
regional differences in labor costs, and
changes in exchange rates affected the way
companies managed their inbound logis-
tics and the geography of the supply link-
ages. In many cases, these characteristics led
to logistics systems that diverged substan-
tially from the prototypical true JIT system.
However, in all cases, the divergences
were consistent with the comprehensive
logistics management principles.
Conclusion
Schoenberger (1997) stated that after the
era of Fordist mass production, which lasted
until the mid-1970s, the capitalist world
entered a new era of TBC. She argued that
this transition will lead to a new geography
of production, a kind of concentrated decon-
centration that is organized around
geographically coherent multinational
market regions. One aspect of this model is
the idea that the increased focus on reducing
order-to-delivery cycles and logistical effi-
ciency will lead to a greater proximity
between buyers and their suppliers and an
increase in local and regional production
linkages. We tested the relevance of this idea
in a case study of the microcomputer hard-
ware industry in Ireland and Scotland.
It was shown that the microcomputer
assemblers imported the vast majority of
components and parts from regions outside
Ireland and Britain, notably from the Far
East, and that the pipelines of most compo-
nents involved inventories, often hubbed
in local warehouses. Some have interpreted
such supply systems as apparent JIT or
pseudo-JIT, a suboptimal inbound logistics
system that is organized on traditional
Fordist, mass production principles. We
have argued that the logistics systems and
the geography of the supply linkages were
not suboptimal. The necessary inbound
inventories were tightly managed, which led
to modest target buffer levels and high ship-
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States, again because the volumes involved did
not warrant the development of a second
source locally.
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ment frequencies. By sourcing from the Far
East, companies were simply trading off
price advantages that could be gained by
using suppliers in low-wage regions against
the efficiencies in logistics that could be
gained by using local suppliers, totally consis-
tent with the modern comprehensive logis-
tics management principles underlying JIT
and TBC. Similarly, the effects of various
component characteristics were consistent
with what could be expected on the basis
of these principles.
The inbound inventory levels were slightly
higher than one would expect on the basis
of comprehensive logistics management
principles alone. However, we have shown
that this situation was not indicative of a
suboptimal supply-chain solution. Rather,
the main reason for the slightly higher levels
lay in the BTO production strategies of the
focal companies. Clearly, the modern
comprehensive logistics management prin-
ciples underlying JIT and TBC can lead to
supply systems that diverge substantially
from the prototypical true JIT system.
What are the lessons for industrial
development policy in Ireland and Scotland?
Industrial policy and the strategies of the
industrial development agencies in Ireland
and Scotland have long included the idea of
building integrated vertical production clus-
ters around subsidiaries of multinational
enterprises (MNEs) (see Industrial Policy
Review Group 1992; Turok 1997), which can
be called the “local sourcing route” to cluster
development (Young, Hood, and Peters,
1994, 669). The findings of this research
suggest that such a strategy is becoming
increasingly unsuitable, at least in the context
of the microcomputer industry.
The suitability of a strategy of building
integrated clusters around subsidiaries of
MNEs in the microcomputer assembly
industry may well become of theoretical
interest only, since Ireland and Scotland
have recently experienced a wave of plant
closures and job losses in the microcomputer
assembly industry. During the 1980s and
most of the 1990s, Ireland and Scotland were
important locations for computer assembly
activity. Supplying the European market
with built-to-order, often customized, bulky,
and relatively valuable systems with short
order lead times required a production loca-
tion in Europe. Within Europe, Ireland and
Scotland offered the required combination
of relatively low wages (on a European
scale), flexible labor markets, and literate
and trainable labor forces. In terms of
Schoenberger’s (1997) model of concen-
trated deconcentration, both countries func-
tioned as the “new semi-periphery” of
Europe.
The situation started to change during the
second half of the 1990s. Wage rates in
Ireland and Scotland were rising rapidly. At
the same time, Eastern Europe was progres-
sively opening up for capitalist economic
activity, which created new production loca-
tions that offered low wages and a rela-
tively skilled labor force, at a short distance
from, and soon to become part of, the EU
market.
As a result, since 1998, much system
assembly activity has been shifting to Eastern
European countries, such as the Czech
Republic and Hungary (van Egeraat and
Jacobson 2004). This shift of assembly
activity, in combination with a competition-
induced shakeout of branded microcom-
puter makers, has led to a severe reduction
in microcomputer assembly activity in
Ireland and Scotland. Of the original five
focal companies that were operating in
Ireland in 1998, only Dell and Apple were
still assembling microcomputers, and Apple’s
system assembly operation was substantially
downsized by 2003. Similarly, of the six orig-
inal focal companies in Scotland, only Sun,
Packard Bell-NEC, IBM, and Compaq/HP
were still assembling systems by 2003, and
IBM and Compaq/HP had significantly
downsized their assembly operations while
Packard Bell-NEC was planning to close
its plant. The reduction of computer
assembly activity resulted in further job
losses in the component sector, notably in
plants that produced the bulky enclosures
that had always required relative proximity
to the system assemblers.
Clearly a strategy of building integrated
vertical clusters around manufacturing
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subsidiaries of MNEs does not look
promising in the context of Ireland and
Scotland. The alternative route identified by
Young, Hood, and Peters (1994, 669) is
through “technological innovation.” Here,
technological cluster development may be
stimulated through cooperative research-
and-development projects involving compa-
nies, university research laboratories, and
governmental research institutions. This
appears to be the more appropriate route
for Ireland and Scotland to take. Both IDA
Ireland and Scottish Enterprise have indeed
adopted elements of such a strategy.
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